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Abstract: 
Non-conviction-based (NCB) asset forfeiture is a relatively recent addition to law 
enforcement's armoury in the fight against organised crime in the UK. It allows for 
criminal assets to be forfeited to the State even in the absence of criminal conviction, 
the stated objective being to undermine the profit incentive of criminal activity. Until 
now, NCB asset forfeiture has principally been critiqued from a criminological point 
of view, specifically concerning the Packer models and the civil / criminal dichotomy 
² aside from this, however, it remains rather underdeveloped theoretically. This 
paper addresses this lack of legal theoretical engagement with NCB asset forfeiture 
by providing an initial contribution from systems-theoretical perspective. This 
FRQWULEXWLRQPDNHVXVHRIV\VWHPVWKHRU\·VXQLTXHLQVLJKWVWRFULWLTXHWKHSHUFHLYHG
¶IDLOXUHRIODZ·WKDWJDYHULVHWRWKH1&%DSSURDFKDQGFKDOOHQJHVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RI
that approach in terms of procedural rights.  
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¶<RXIROORZGUXJV\RXJHWGUXJDGGLFWVDQGGUXJGHDOHUV%XW\RXVWDUWWRIROORZWKH
money, and you GRQ
WNQRZZKHUHWKHIFNLW
VJRQQDWDNH\RX· 
² Detective Lester Freamon, The Wire (2002) 
 
 
Inherent to the criminal process are certain procedural safeguards for the protection 
of a suspect or an accused. These safeguards include the presumption of innocence, 
the burden of proof resting with the prosecution, and the heightened standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt (see, generally, Roberts and Hunter, 2012; Jackson 
and Summers, 2012; Langbein, 2003), and are traditionally justified by reference to, 
inter alia, the relationship between the State and the individual, the imbalance of the 
6WDWH DQG GHIHQGDQW·V UHVSHFWLYH UHVRXUFHV WKH SRWHQWLDO FRQVHTXHQFHV RI D JXLOW\
verdict, the avoidance of wrongful convictions, and respect for individual dignity and 
autonomy (see, e.g. Lippke, 2013; Ashworth, 2006). This notwithstanding, increased 
concern about organized criminal activities2 combined with the perception that such 
GXHSURFHVVVDIHJXDUGVDQGOLEHUDODSSURDFKHVKDYHUHVXOWHGLQD¶IDLOXUH·RIFULPLQDO
law to tackle such criminality effectively have, over the past two decades, brought 
about changes within the criminal process, changes which have tended both to 
implement an ideology of crime control and to display a sense of populist 
punitiveness. While it might have been assumed that such significant procedural 
                                                     
1 Our grateful thanks to Liz Campbell, Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Toby Seddon, Chris 
Thornhill, Tom Webb, and the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments. 
2 Political discourse on organised crime regularly assumes that there is a hierarchical structure in 
place. It is not our intention in this article to engage with the organisation of organised crime groups, 
or networks. For discussion elsewhere see, e.g. Alach, 2011; Spapens, 2010; Easton and Karaivanov, 
2009; Kenney, 2007; Paoli, 2002; and Coles, 2001. In Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised 
Crime +0*RYHUQPHQWLWZDVUHFRJQLVHGWKDW¶2UJDQLVHGFULPHJURXSVYDU\LQWKHLU
structure and capabilities. In the UK many organised criminals work with a core of associates, but 
often move in and RXWRIQHWZRUNVGHSHQGLQJRQWKHFULPLQDODFWLYLW\· 
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changes would have had an impact upon concerns regarding the threat posed by 
organised crime, this was not the case; if anything, the perception of the 
inadequacies of existing criminal justice procedures for this task even increased. This 
prompted the development of an alternative approach that made use of civil 
processes to target criminal assets, contained in the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 
(POCA) 2002. Part 5 of this Act makes provision for civil recovery ² also referred 
to as non-conviction based (NCB) asset forfeiture 3 ² D¶IROORZ-the-PRQH\·DSSURDFK
that allows for assets to be seized, not only in the absence of criminal conviction but 
also using the civil standard of proof. Given that Part 5 is purportedly a civil 
procedure, the rules of criminal evidence do not apply here; this opens the door to 
admission of different types of evidence that would not be admissible at a criminal 
trial, including inferences from silence, previous behaviour, illegally obtained evidence 
and abuse of process, and hearsay evidence (see Alldridge, 2014: 185 - 187). This 
QHZSURFHGXUHZDVLPSOHPHQWHGLQGLUHFWUHVSRQVHWRWKHSHUFHLYHG¶IDLOXUH·RIWKH
FULPLQDO ODZLQ LWV ILJKWDJDLQVWRUJDQL]HGFULPHDVJDOYDQLVDWLRQRIFULPLQDO MXVWLFH·V
                                                     
3 It must be acknowledged that there is often confusion as to the terminology used. The Hodgson 
&RPPLWWHH QRWHG WKH ODFN RI DQ\ ´JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG WHUPLQRORJ\µ DQG ZHQW RQ WR GLVWLQJXLVK
EHWZHHQ ¶IRUIHLWXUH· ¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ· ¶UHVWLWXWLRQ· DQG ¶FRQILVFDWLRQ· 7KH &RPPLWWHH GHILQHG
IRUIHLWXUH DV ´WKH SRZHU RI WKH &RXUW WR WDNH SURSHUW\ WKDW LV LPPHGLDWHO\ FRQQHFWHG ZLWK DQ
RIIHQFHµ&RQILVFDWLRQZDVGHILQHGDV´WKHGHSULYLQJRIDQRIIHQGHURIWKHSURFHHGs or the profits of 
FULPHµ+RZDUG/HDJXHIRU3HQDO5HIRUP- 5). In its Report on confiscation and forfeiture, 
WKH6FRWWLVK/DZ&RPPLVVLRQQRWHGWKDW¶IRUIHLWXUH·LQLWVWHUPVRIUHIHUHQFHZDVXVHGLQ
two different senses: first, the power of a court to take property used for the purpose of committing, 
or facilitating the commission of, offences, and second the power of a court to deprive an offender of 
the proceeds of criminal activity and of property derived from such proceeds. The Scottish Law 
&RPPLVVLRQZHQWRQWRVD\WKDW´¶)RUIHLWXUH·OLNHZLVHVLJQLILHV both powers in American usage, while 
¶FRQILVFDWLRQ·LVVRPHWLPHVXVHGWRVLJQLI\ERWKLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQVDQGLQGHHGLVVRXVHGLQ
WKH>&RQYHQWLRQRQ/DXQGHULQJ6HDUFK6HL]XUHDQG&RQILVFDWLRQRIWKH3URFHHGVIURP&ULPH@µ7KH
Scottish Law ComPLVVLRQH[SUHVVHGLWVSUHIHUHQFHWRXVHWKHWHUP¶IRUIHLWXUH·LQWKHILUVWVHQVHDQG
¶FRQILVFDWLRQ· LQ WKH VHFRQG VHQVH Vettori (2006: 2) notes the distinction between the UK/ EU 
PHDQLQJRI¶IRUIHLWXUH·DQGLWVPHDQLQJLQWKH86´ZKHUHLWKDVDPXFKZLGHU FRYHUDJHµ9HWWRULJRHV
RQWRQRWHWKDW´VWLOOWRGD\WKHWZRWHUPV² forfeiture and confiscation ² are used interchangeably, so 
WKDWWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUFRQIXVLRQLVKLJKµ 
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blunted weaponry, as a re-weighting of respective power dynamics, and as 
circumvention of the inherent procedural safeguards outlined above.4 
 
Perhaps as a result of its novelty, both in terms of its unusual characteristics and its 
newness, NCB asset forfeiture remains somewhat under-theorised. Criminologists 
(e.g. Lea, 2004) have broken ground in this regard but their concerns have related 
mainly to the civil / criminal dichotomy and discussions of due process rights. This 
paper will target the lack of theorising in the legal field5 by providing an initial 
systems-theoretical contribution, one that will explore the complex and unusual 
issue of NCB forfeiture as a means of combatting organised crime, particularly in 
terms of how far legal responses to organised crime impinge upon individual 
procedural rights. The advantages of a systems perspective here are not only that its 
emphasis on function and communication provides insights into structural patterns 
that might otherwise be overlooked, but also that its antihumanism is well suited to 
the evaluation of a crime control approach noted for its apersonal character.  
 
This analysis will proceed in two parts. The first will explain why organised crime 
poses such a problem for criminal law enforcement, and then present this (initial) 
¶IDLOXUH·RI ODZDVDGLVDSSRLQWPHQWRIQRUPDWLYHH[SHFWDWLRQV WKDWUHTXLUHGD OHJDO
systemic response for their restablization ² namely the resort to NCB forfeiture. 
The second part will chart this regulatory response and argue that it goes too far in 
its assault on procedural rights protections. By undermining these restrictions on 
                                                     
4 It can be argued that civil processes are increasingly used in pursuit of criminal law objectives, an 
obvious example being Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. For discussion in the context of NCB asset 
forfeiture, see King (2012). 
5 7KHPDLQWKHRUHWLFDOFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHOHJDOILHOGLV&DPSEHOO·VDUWLFOH¶Theorising Asset 
Forfeiture in Ireland·ZKLFKIXUWKHUFULWLTXHV3DFNHU·VGXHSURFHVVFULPHFRQWUROPRGHOVDVZHOODV
considering issues of criminal administration and adaptation to reality.  
 5 
State power, NCB forfeiture has the effect of facilitating systemic excesses, which in 
WXUQ HQJHQGHU D VXEVHTXHQW ¶IDLOXUH· RI ODZ WKLV WLPH RQH RI WKH OHJDO V\VWHP·V
legitimacy instead of efficiency.  
 
$¶)DLOXUH·RI/DZ 
 
As mentioned above, the threat posed by serious and organised crime (see, e.g. 
Home Office, 2004, 2006)6 has motivated much legislative change within criminal law 
and evidentiary procedures since the mid-1990s. For example, the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 placed restrictions upon the right to silence, aimed 
specifically at professional criminals and terrorists (see Quirk, 2013; Jackson, 2001). 
After the turn of the millennium, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 overhauled the law 
governing admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings (see Jones, 2010; 
Birch, 2004), the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 introduced a 
statutory framework for agreements with assisting offenders (Martin, 2013; de 
Grazia and Hyland, 2011), and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 contained 
qualifications to anonymity provisions (see Ormerod, Choo and Easter, 2010), while 
since 9/11 there have also been numerous changes to anti-terrorism legislation (see, 
generally, Walker, 2009; Donohue, 2008). Common to each of these legislative 
changes is the reliance upon allegations of a failure RIWKHFULPLQDOODZ·VSURFHGXUHV
to push them through, while the augmentation of those procedures invariably comes 
at the expense of individual rights. Hence, adverse inferences can potentially be 
drawn where an individual fails to answer questions at the police station or refuses 
to give evidence at their own trial, despite concern as to the evidential value of such 
                                                     
6 For discussion of legal measures used against organised crime, see Campbell (2013a). 
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adverse inferences; hearsay evidence is more readily admissible, contrary to 
longstanding criticisms; evidence from accomplices is embraced in spite of the 
inherent dangers, not least that an accomplice might be trying to gain favour with the 
police or prosecutors; and, finally, anonymous witnesses can tender evidence, 
notwithstanding the obvious difficulties that the accused would face in raising a 
challenge to that evidence.  
 
These examples are cited in order to illustrate the clear and concerted erosion of 
procedural safeguards afforded to a suspect or accused within the criminal justice 
process ² D¶UHEDODQFLQJ·LQIDYRXURI6WDWHSRZHUWKDW continues even today (see, e.g. 
HM Government, 2011, 2013). The attack upon the financial assets of criminality 
manifest in POCA 2002 is a further instance of the State being afforded enhanced 
powers in tackling organised crime (see Murray, 2012; Sproat, 2009; Kennedy, 2005). 
Indeed, this targeting of criminal finances can be regarded as yet another move to 
weight criminal justice processes away from the individual and towards the State, on 
the assumption that classical forms and procedures were on their own unfit and 
inefficacious for the purpose of tackling organised crime. Falling under the collective 
WLWOH RI D ¶IROORZ-the-PRQH\· DSSURDFK VLQFH WKH WXUQ RI WKH PLOOHQQLXP PHDVXUHV
concentrating on criminal finances have gained increasing prominence (see, e.g 
Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000; for discussion, Bullock and Lister, 2014: 
48ff): anti-money laundering provisions, post-conviction confiscation, civil recovery 
absent criminal conviction, taxation of assets and counter terrorist financing 
measures have all came to the fore.7 Our focus in this critique is civil recovery, also 
                                                     
7 See Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. For discussion, see Gilmore, 2011; Rees et al, 2011; Alldridge, 
2003. Similarly, on counter terrorist financing measures, see Terrorism Act 2000; Terrorist Asset-
Freezing etc Act 2010; Donohue, 2008: ch.3.  
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known as NCB forfeiture.8 While NCB forfeiture was presented as an alternative 
approach whereby the attention would be on criminal assets, it was in fact a further 
illustration of the prevailing crime control ideology, which ² we will argue ² served 
further to undermine the individual procedural rights inherent to the legitimate 
operation of criminal justice processes. 
 
Before in personam confiscation of assets can occur under Part 2 of POCA, there 
must be a criminal conviction, subsequent to which civil rules are applied.9 The 
underpinning normative rationale, namely that convicted criminals should not benefit 
from crime, is in this regard relatively uncontroversial.10 The same, however, cannot 
be said for in rem NCB asset forfeiture: for example, under Part 5 of POCA, an 
individual may be subject to restrictions regarding dealing with specified property 
where the court is satisfied that said property comprises the proceeds of crime (for 
detailed rules see, e.g. Sutherland Williams et al, 2013; Rees et al, 2011). Moreover, 
the standard of proof to be applied in such cases is the civil one, namely the lower 
threshold of a balance of probabilities, as opposed to the more robust criminal 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt (POCA 2002, s241(3)), and the SWDWH·VKDQGLV
strengthened all the more by the lack of any requirement that the individual be 
convicted of a criminal offence before their property is liable to become the subject 
of such proceedings.11  
                                                     
8 See n.3 for discussion of definitional issues.  
9 There must first be a criminal conviction, with guilt established to the high criminal standard ² 
beyond reasonable doubt. While the confiscation proceedings themselves are criminal in nature, the 
standard of proof is the civil one ² the balance of probabilities. The rules of evidence are, apparently, 
those of a sentencing hearing (Alldridge, 2014: 173 ² 174; see also Rees et al, 2011: 21). 
10 Though see Bullock and Lister (2014) for a critique of post-conviction confiscation in the UK.  
11 7KLV¶FLYLO·SURFHVVKDVFRQVLVWHQWO\EHHQXSKHOGE\KLJKHUFRXUWVLQWKH8.HJGale v SOCA [2011] 
UKSC 49; Director of ARA v Walsh [2004] NIQB 21) and in other common law jurisdictions (e.g. 
Chatterjee v Ontario (Attorney General) [2009] 1 SCR 624 (Canada); GM, PB, PC Ltd, GH; Gilligan v CAB 
[2001] 4 IR 113 (Ireland)). For critique of ECHR jurisprudence, see King (2014b).   
 8 
 
But what is it about organised crime that makes it such a problem for criminal law 
enforcement, and why the emphasis on its financial proceeds? The main difficulty 
facing law enforcement agencies appears to be the disconnected or cumulative 
QDWXUH RI WKH FULPLQDO DFWLYLW\ ZKLFK SURYLGHV WKH ¶RUJDQLVHUV· Zith a degree of 
GLVWDQFH IURP WKH ¶FRDOIDFH· DV LWZHUH DQG WKXV D FHUWDLQ OHYHO RI LPPXQLW\ IURP
successful police investigation, prosecution and conviction.12 As Lord Goldsmith 
stated during the passage of the Proceeds of Crime Bill: 
Someone at the centre of a criminal organisation may succeed in 
distancing himself sufficiently from the criminal acts themselves so that 
there is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual criminal 
participation on his part. Witnesses may decline to come forward 
because they feel intimidated. Alternatively, there may be strong evidence 
WKDW WKH OX[XU\ KRXVH « WKH \DFKWV DQG WKH IDVW PRWRU FDUV KDYH QRW
been acquired by any lawful activity because none is apparent. It may also 
be plain from intelligence that the person is someone engaged in criminal 
activity, but it may not be clear what type of crime. It could be drug 
trafficking, money laundering or bank robbery. However, the prosecution 
may not be able to say exactly what is the crime, and thus the person will 
be entitled to he [sic] acquitted of each and every offence. If, in a criminal 
trial, the prosecution cannot prove that the person before the court is in 
fact guilty of this bank robbery or that act of money laundering, then he is 
                                                     
12 For discussion of the adoption of NCB measures to tackle organized crime in different common 
law jurisdictions see, for example, Gallant (2014), King (2014a), Campbell (2010), and Meade (2000). 
See, also, the views of the Working Group on Confiscation (1998)).  
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entitled to be acquitted. Yet it is as plain as a pikestaff that his money has 
been acquired as the proceeds of crime.13 
/RUG*ROGVPLWK·VIUXVWUDWLRQVKHUHFRQFHUQWKHHYLGHQWODFNRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFHWRROV
suitable for dealing effectively with such criminality, hampered as they were by 
procedural safeguards frequently seen as providing excessive protection for criminals 
who, by virtue of operating at a remove, do not risk getting their own hands dirty.14 
7KH DSSDUHQW ¶IDLOXUHV· RI WKH FULPLQDO ODZ KHUH DUH FOHDU WR VHH police time and 
public money are wasted on the arrest and prosecution of easily replaceable foot 
soldiers, while those at the upper echelons of the criminal enterprise remain 
insulated against criminal liability (Simser, 2009: 20). 
 
7KHVHLVVXHVRIWKHFULPLQDOODZ·VILWQHVs for purpose and efficacy can be articulated 
systems-theoretically as a failure of the legal system to achieve its primary function, 
namely the stabilization of normative expectations in society. The role of a 
functionally differentiated legal system in society is to enable society to differentiate 
between communications that are lawful or legal, and communications that are 
unlawful or illegal. To this degree, it makes it possible for society to establish what 
will meet with legal censure or legal approval, and what will be subject to legal 
VDQFWLRQ DV /XKPDQQ   VWDWHV ¶ODZ GHDOV ZLWK WKH IXQFWLRQ RI WKH
stabilization of normative expectations by regulating how they are generalized in 
UHODWLRQ WR WKHLU WHPSRUDO IDFWXDO DQG VRFLDO GLPHQVLRQV· Expectations allow for 
both the evolution and smooth operation of the system while simultaneously 
                                                     
13 House of Lords Debate, Proceeds of Crime Bill, 25 June 2002, vol.636, cc.1270-71, per Lord 
Goldsmith. 
14 For analogous discussion in the context of international crimes, see Ambos (2009); van der Wilt 
(2009). 
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providing for its connection with previous operations and selections; they build up 
RYHU WLPH IDFLOLWDWLQJ V\VWHPLF ¶OHDUQLQJ· E\ UHGXFLQJ WKH QXPEHU RI SRVVible 
selections created under conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, without this reduction or 
¶FRQGHQVDWLRQ· ¶WKH EXUGHQ RI VHOHFWLRQ ZRXOG EH WRR JUHDW IRU FRQQHFWLQJ
RSHUDWLRQV· (Luhmann, 1995: 96). To restrict this analysis for the moment to the 
criminal law, the (normative) expectations here are that social communications 
comprising illegal behavior will be designated as such, which is to say, will generate 
the systemic operations familiar to us as the criminal justice process: police action, 
arrest, charge, prosecution, proof, conviction, and proportionate sanction. These 
operations can be conflated into a single core expectation, namely that the legal 
system will counteract and punish criminal ² and thus illegal ² activity within society. 
On this basis, WKHUHIRUH LW ZRXOG DSSHDU WKDW WKH LQFUHDVHG ¶LQDSSOLFDELOLW\· RI
criminal law procedures to the complexities of organized crime comprises the 
disappointment of these expectations.  
It is the reaction of the legal system to such disappointed normative expectations 
that drives its evolution and maintains its autonomy (Rogowski, 2013: 4). Its 
cognitive openness to the environment means that the legal system is not restricted 
to applying established normative standards, although it does retain that option; it 
can either follow this route ² namely one of counterfactual stabilization ² or it can 
learn from the disappointment and recalculate its expectations on that basis. 
Different socio-legal examples can be cited of each of these legal-systemic options: 
for instance, no matter how many homicides are committed, repeated 
disappointment of the normative expectation that people should not kill others has 
not prompted any alteration of the legal prohibition, while the decriminalization of 
suicide by the Suicide Act 1961 illustrates a legislative change being implemented 
 11 
where the illegal act was considered apocryphal.15 The case of organized crime 
appears, however, to have given rise to a third option, one which, we submit, is 
SUHPLVHGXSRQWKHDSSDUHQW ¶IDLOXUH·RI Oaw outlined above ² D ¶IDLOXUH·RQHVKRXOG
note, of procedural efficacy (Leistung) as opposed to the systemic function (Funktion). 
The legal system in this situation counterfactually stabilizes those disappointed 
normative expectations ² crime should not pay, illegal behavior should be punished ² 
while simultaneously effecting changes to its system-internal programming 
(Konditionalprogramme) targeting those aspects restricting its smooth and effective 
operation, which in this case can be identified as the established procedural 
safeguards within the criminal process. As Teubner (1992: 15) says, the law regulates 
society by regulating itself. The erosion of these procedural safeguards ² for 
example, the rule against hearsay, restrictions on investigatory powers, and 
exclusionary rules of evidence, to name but a few ² has been accompanied by the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI D ¶IROORZ-the-PRQH\· DSSURDFK LQ WKH IRUP RI 1&% IRUIHLWXUH
which further diminishes those procedural protections assumed to be inherent to 
criminal proceedings ² especially the presumption of innocence and the standard of 
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  
As mentioned above, it is really when the focus shifts to the money ² WKH¶OLIHEORRG
RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ· 6LPVHU   DV LW ZHUH ² that a systems theoretical 
perspective comes into its own, mirroring in its own antihumanism the apersonal 
quality exhibited by a follow-the-money approach.16 In what is perhaps the most 
alienating aspect of systems theory for some scholars, Luhmann deliberately 
                                                     
15 The UK Supreme Court delivered its judgment in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38 
in June 2014. For discussion of the role of criminal law in cases of assisted suicide and euthanasia, see 
Mullock (forthcoming; 2012); Coggon (2010); Price (2009).  
16 Our opening quote from The Wire captures well this move from individual to systemic medium 
within systems theory. 
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decenters the individual, thus bypassing the classic dichotomy of subject/object that 
restricted the ambit of many other sociological approaches. This move also 
facilitated the construction of an overarching epistemological framework premised 
upon the distinction system/environment, and the differentiation of social systems on 
the basis of their function. These function systems comprise the deep structures of 
society, identifiable by their respective codes, programmes and media. The function 
systems of most relevance to this analysis are the legal, economic and political 
systems17 ZKLOH WKH OHJDO V\VWHP·V FRUH IXQFWLRQ LV WKH VWDELOL]DWLRQ RI QRUPDWLYH
expectations in order to eliminate contingency, the economic system functions to 
regulate scarcity, and communicates through the symbolically generalized 
communicative medium18 of money (see Moeller, 2006: 26-29), while the political 
system in turn carries out its function of making binding decisions for society 
through the medium of power. What makes a follow-the-money approach so 
interesting, therefore, is the involvement of the communicative medium of one 
system in the programmes and operations of another. This is not to say, of course, 
that there is any disruption of systemic autonomy: for example, the economic 
PHGLXPRIPRQH\LV¶VHHQ·E\WKHOHJDOV\VWHPDVWKHUHVXOWRILOOHJDOFRPPXQLFDWLYH
acts ² literally, the proceeds of crime. More important, however, is the structural 
coupling between the legal and economic systems in the form oIWKH¶LQVWLWXWLRQ·RI
the financial sanction (Richardson, 2002: 138; see also Luhmann, 1993: 453-456). 
NCB forfeiture has the overt aims of deterring criminal activity through reduced 
returns and demonstrating the non-profitability of crime (Performance and 
                                                     
17 Another function system of arguable relevance is that of the mass media (see Nobles & Schiff 1995, 
and 2013: chapter 8). 
18 3ULRUWRVHWWOLQJRQWKHWHUP¶VRFLDOV\VWHP·LQKLVWH[WSoziale Systeme, Luhmann relied upon 
7DOFRWW3DUVRQV·WHUPLQRORJ\RI¶V\PEROLFDOO\JHQHUDOL]HGFRPPXQLFDWLYHPHGLD·6HH/XKPDQQ
191ff)  
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Innovation Unit, 2000: para.3.2) ² these regulatory aims19 provide the scale upon 
which the efficacy of the system would ideally be gauged,20 while NCB forfeiture is 
classifiable as a financial sanction and thus a structural coupling between law and 
economics.  
At this juncture some reference ought to be made to the unusual civil/criminal 
hybrid nature of NCB forfeiture, which has been the subject of much critique and 
conjecture. Though usually concerning allegations of criminality, NCB forfeiture 
proceediQJVDUHSXUSRUWHGO\¶FLYLO·DTXHVWLRQDEOHVWDQFHWKDWKDVEHHQXSKHOGE\WKH
courts (e.g. Gale v SOCA [2011] UKSC 49). And, as these proceedings are seen as 
civil, criminal procedural protections do not necessarily apply. This has attracted 
widespread crLWLFLVP ZLWK PDQ\ FRPPHQWDWRUV DUJXLQJ WKDW ¶FLYLO· RU 1&%
forfeiture ought to be regarded as a criminal mechanism (e.g. Gray, 2012; Campbell, 
2010, 2007; Gallant, 2004). At the very least, NCB forfeiture arguably represents a 
¶PLGGOHJURXQG· EHWZHHQ FLYil and criminal paradigms (see Mann, 1991).21 While 
interesting issues for critique from a systems theoretical perspective are raised by 
1&%IRUIHLWXUH·VVWUDQJHSURFHGXUDOK\EULGLW\V\VWHPVWKHRU\LQIDFWDFFRPPRGDWHV
this elision of civil and criminal rather well; at least, it is not as jarring for systems 
theory as for other legal theories centred around the individual and on 
considerations of State power and authority. The reason for this is the system 
                                                     
19 Additional regulatory aims of NCB forfeiture are the disruption of criminal networks, and the 
reinforcement of public confidence in the criminal justice process. 
20 The reality is otherwise, however. The success of follow-the-money strategies is ultimately 
measured by monetary returns, as illustrated in the recent report by the National Audit Office (2013) 
on confiscation orders, subsequently discussed by the Public Accounts Committee: House of 
Commons, Oral Evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee, Confiscation Orders, 
Wednesday 15 January 2014, available at:  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/public-
accounts/PAC%20uncorrected%20transcript%2015%2001%2014.pdf (accessed 10/02/2014). It is 
unsurprising, then, that some commentators have questioned the underpinning assumptions, and 
expectations, of the asset recovery regime. See Bullock and Lister, 2014 and Harvey, 2014.  
21 This is discussed in relation to NCB forfeiture by King (2012: 358) and Campbell (2010: 32). 
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boundary established by the operation of the legal V\VWHP·VELQDU\FRGLQJ8QGHUWKLV
coding ² where legal is the positive value, applied if a social fact conforms to system 
norms, and illegal is the negative value, employed by the legal system in the event 
such norms are violated ² societal communications DUH¶VHHQ·E\WKHOHJDOV\VWHPDV
being of relevance to it. The dichotomy civil/criminal, therefore, is encompassed by 
the systemic code and included within the unity of the legal system.  
 
Where this civil/criminal distinction does feature is in terms of additional system-
internal semantic elements known as programmes: as Luhmann (2004: 192, emphasis 
LQRULJLQDOH[SODLQV¶>V@LQFHWKHYDOXHVOHJDODQGLOOHJDODUHQRWLQWKHPVHOYHVFULWHULD
for the decision between legal and illegal, there must be further points of view that 
indicate whether or not and how the values of a code are to be allocated, rightly or 
wrongly· 7KHVH SURJUDPPHV DUH FRQGLWLRQDO LQ FKDUDFWHU Konditionalprogramme), 
which is to say that they stipulate the conditions under which the binary coding is 
applied, linking self-UHIHUHQFH ZLWK H[WHUQDO UHIHUHQFH DQG SURYLGLQJ ¶WKH V\VWHP·V
orientation to and from its environment with a form that is cognitive and at the 
same time whLFK FDQ EH HYDOXDWHG GHGXFWLYHO\ LQ WKH V\VWHP· LELG  :LWKLQ
WKHVHFRQGLWLRQDOSURJUDPPHVH[LVWIXUWKHUUHIOH[LYHPHFKDQLVPVIRUWKH¶UHFXUVLYH
UHSURGXFWLRQ·RIOHJDOGHFLVLRQVWKHPRVWQRWDEOHRIWKHVHEHLQJUXOHVRISURFHGXUH
which have the task RI¶DSSO\LQJQRUPVWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIQRUPV·LELG,WLV
by means of the operation of these conditional programmes that the legal system is 
able to restructure its internal procedures in a way that addresses problems of 
operative efficiency (Leistung VXFK DV WKH ¶IDLOXUH· RI ODZ DGHTXDWHO\ WR WDFNOH WKH
complexities of organised crime. Such restructuring reorients the rules of 
procedure, such as in the case of NCB forfeiture, allowing their application in 
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situations where they would previously have been inapplicable and unenforceable: 
the use of a civil standard of proof in what is, arguably, a criminal mechanism, for 
example.  
 
To be clear in this regard, such system-internal reorganisation is purely operational 
and undertaken to optimise its realisation / achievement of its primary function ² the 
legal system has no interest in the civil/criminal dichotomy other than operatively. 
Nor does it engage with issues of either the moral content of the law or the policy 
motivations for legislative22 change ² in spite of the crime control ideology 
underpinning follow-the-money approaches, not to mention their overt political and 
QRUPDWLYHLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\WKHOHJDOV\VWHP·VFRJQLWLYHRSHQQHVVLVUHVWULFWHGE\WKH
filter of its binary code and systemic autonomy is protected by means of its 
QRUPDWLYH FORVXUH 7R SXW WKLV DQRWKHU ZD\ ZKLOH SHUFHLYHG ¶IDLOXUH· RI ODZ LQ
tackling organised crime led to the adoption of the draconian option of NCB 
forfeiture under POCA 2002, the legal system only experiences these in terms of an 
initial disappointment of normative expectations and a subsequent alteration of its 
internal programming.  
 
Thus far this article has concentrated on what we have been referring to as the 
¶IDLOXUH·RIFULPLQDOODZDQGSURFHVVHVLQHIIHFWLvely combatting organised crime. This 
has been presented as a failure of Leistung, of legal systemic efficiency and procedural 
fitness for purpose, a situation that gave rise to follow-the-money approaches in 
general and NCB forfeiture in particular. Our attention now turns to NCB 
                                                     
22¶/XKPDQQ FODLPV WKDW ODZ UHWDLQV LWV DXWRQRP\ LQ WKH IDFH RI SROLWLFDO SRZHU WKURXJK WKH
constitutionalising of that political power. Legislation provides a methodology for law to incorporate 
political dePDQGVZLWKRXWEHFRPLQJODZ·6FKLIIDQG1REOHV 
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forfeiture, this hybrid civil/criminal legislative creation, with the view of examining its 
circumvention of procedural safeguards comprising fundamental individual and 
procedural rights. This critique submits that this simultaneous evasion and erosion of 
procedural rights protections serves to render NCB forfeiture illegitimate as a 
process, on the grounds that it is non-compliant with rights protections. This 
systems theoretically based argument, namely that NCB forfeiture gives rise to a 
GLIIHUHQWNLQGRI¶IDLOXUH·RIODZZLOOIRUPWKHIRFXVRIWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ 
 
 
How Far Is Too Far?  
 
The dynamic at the heart of the crime control / due process dichotomy is one which 
demands the striking of a balance between considerations of State power and those 
of individual liberties. This interaction not only lies at the heart of criminal justice 
process but at the heart of modern constitutional development ² it involves what we 
WHQGWRUHIHUWRDVWKH¶UXOHRIODZ·ZKLFKLVWRVD\WKDWFonstitutional) commitment 
to minimum standards of both substantive and procedural fairness. Whether 
understood as entrenched principles of the common law or meta-principles 
articulated in international agreements and enacted by legislation,23 rights such as due 
process and the right to a fair trial (European Convention on Human Rights Article 
6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 14) not only represent 
¶SULQFLSOHG H[SUHVVLRQVRI WKHPRUDO OLIH RI WKHQDWLRQ Sittlichkeit· /RXJKOLQ 
361) but also comprise limitations upon the potential excesses in the exercise of 
governmental power. Indeed, it could even be argued that rights protections have 
                                                     
23 For discussion, see Ho, 2012; Ashworth, 2012. 
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EHFRPHDODXQGU\OLVWRIUHTXLUHPHQWVDPRXQWLQJWR¶DFRQWUDFWRIJRRG JRYHUQPHQW·
(Tomkins, 2003) and, furthermore, an indicator of good governance.24  
 
As outlined above, however, such processes and thresholds certainly contributed to 
difficulties in successfully prosecuting individuals suspected of participating in and 
benefitting from organized crime ² not only do they curb abuses of power, they also 
operate as a necessary restraint upon the efficacious operation25 of the criminal law, 
WKXVJLYLQJULVH WR WKH ILUVW ¶IDLOXUH·RI ODZ'RX]LQDV  VWDWHG WKDW ¶ULJKWV
DUHWKHQHFHVVDU\DQGLPSRVVLEOHFODLPRIODZWRMXVWLFH·DQGWKLVGXDOLW\RIQHFHVVLW\
and impossibility has perhaps never been more apparent than it is here: while in the 
first instance rights comprise a barrier to the application of the classical processes of 
criminal justice, in the second any reliance upon them comes at the arguable expense 
of legal operations that are perceived ² LQ /RUG*ROGVPLWK·V ¶SODLQ DV D SLNHVWDII·26 
sense of the term ² as being just.  
 
For this is the point at hand, and the problem facing both criminal law enforcement 
agencies and criminal justice itself: the attrition of formerly robust and entrenched 
procedural standards within criminal justice has the effect of giving rise to anti-
organised crime practices that are ² if not de facto illegitimate ² at the very least in 
contradiction to the spirit of the rule of law. As mentioned earlier, criminal 
procedural safeguards are justified by reference to the relationship between the 
State and the individual, the balance of resources between them, the consequences 
                                                     
24 As outlined on the website of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
5LJKWV¶WKHWUXHWHVWRIJRRGJRYHUQDQFHLVWKHGHJUHe to which it delivers on the promise of human 
ULJKWVFLYLOFXOWXUDOHFRQRPLFSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOULJKWV·)RUIXUWKHUGHWDLOVVHHDFFHVVHG
http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx  
25 ¶(IILFDFLRXV·LVXWLOL]HGKHUHDVDFULWLFDOWHUPZLWKLQRXUV\VWHPVWKHRUHWLFDODUJXPHQWWKDWVDLGLWLV
DUJXDEO\DOVRLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH¶FRQYH\RUEHOW·ZLWKLQ3DFNHU·VFULPHFRQWUROPRGHO 
26 House of Lords Debate, Proceeds of Crime Bill, 25 June 2002, vol.636, cc.1271. 
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of an adverse verdict for an accused, and respect for individual dignity and autonomy. 
In NCB forfeiture proceedings, such safeguards are sidestepped in spite of such 
proceedings being, in essence, concerned with matters of criminal law. It is our 
contention that this step is, simply, one too far. Indeed, the only salient difference 
amounts to the fact that what is being targeted is not individual liberty but, rather, an 
LQGLYLGXDO·V property ² as such the protection provided appears far less robust for 
personal property and assets than if the deprivation concerned either personal 
integrity or freedom.27 
 
While the initial failure of law outlined in the previous section is one of legal 
systemic efficiency, of Leistung, it does not automatically follow that we are alleging a 
subsequent failure of Funktion in this section; the failure we pinpoint here is, rather, 
one of legitimacy. As mentioned above, constitutional due process rights and the 
right to a fair trial can be understood as reflecting a moral position as well as forming 
a bulwark against the abuse of political power; however, it is in terms of this latter 
understanding that systems theory understands constitutional rights. Indeed, the 
notions of morality, justice and fairness contained within the former have little 
purchase under a systems theoretical construction that reduces both justice and 
validity to eigen-YDOXHV ZKLFK LV WR VD\ WR YDOXHV WKDW DUH FRQVWLWXWHG E\ ¶WKH
recursivH SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH V\VWHP·V RZQ RSHUDWLRQV DQG >«ZKLFK@ FDQQRW EH
XVHGDQ\ZKHUHHOVH·/XKPDQQRUUDWKHUWKDWDUHSURGXFHGVLPSO\E\D
V\VWHP¶UHSHDWHGO\GRLQJZKDWLWGRHV·1REOHVDQG6FKLII 
                                                     
27 To an already problematic situation we could include here additional considerations of personal 
UHSXWDWLRQDQG¶JRRGQDPH·. See Campbell (2013b: 705 ² ZKHUHLWLVVXJJHVWHGWKDW´ZKLOHWKH
ostensible rationale [of civil recovery] is to recoup unlawfully acquired assets, and while these orders 
are directed at the property rather than the person, recovery also incorporates a substantial stigma 
and incorporates the blame that distinguishes criminal from civil measures, with the former connoting 
¶VKRXOGQRWGR·µUHIHUHQFHVRPLWWHG 
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Systems theory conceptualizes riJKWVDVDPHDQVE\ZKLFKVRFLHW\LVDEOHWR¶SURWHFW
its own structure against self-GHVWUXFWLYHWHQGHQFLHV·9HUVFKUDHJHQ, such 
as de-differentiation. Rights operate specifically as communications of the political 
system that comprise curbs upon its potential excesses, thus establishing limitations 
to be imposed upon the political system and its operations by the political system 
itself. Not only do these rights operate as instruments of self-restriction but they 
also preclude systemic de-differentiation. 7KLV¶HVWDEOLVKPHQW·² or self-creation ² of 
V\VWHPLFOLPLWDWLRQVLVDFFRPSOLVKHGE\DFRQFUHWL]DWLRQRIV\VWHPLFH[SHFWDWLRQV¶LQ
their very concreteness, the rights-based expectations take on the nature of fixed 
points, of facts· +HQGU\4: 68). In the absence of any such limitations upon its 
operations, the political system would be liable to encroach upon those of other 
IXQFWLRQV\VWHPV LQDPDQQHU OLDEOH WRFRPSURPLVH ¶WKHDELOLW\RIRWKHUV\VWHPVWR
operate in ways that are productive IRUVRFLHW\·1REOHVDQG6FKLII-200). 
It should be noted at this juncture that the fixation upon protecting society from the 
dangers of de-differentiation is, for Luhmann, restricted to those excesses of the 
political system; it is not until Teubner (2006; 2008), who insists that other function 
systems need to operate under comparable controls, that the excesses and crises of 
the other systems are appreciated as being equally as dangerous to those of politics. 
Taking an overtly normative stance, Teubner thereby endorses rights as a shield 
against the structural violence created by unrestricted functional differentiation.  
What becomes important in this regard is the influence of rights upon not only the 
functionally differentiated political system but also the legal system and the economic 
system, and all of the others. In the same vein that the political system is subject to 
restraints upon its operations and programmes, so too is the legal system, with the 
 20 
result that its own operations and conditional programmes, its own media and eigen-
values, must occur relative to those restraints. This, then, is our argument 
concerning the erosion of procedural safeguards facilitated (with overt political 
instrumentality) in the form of NCB forfeiture under POCA 2002:  the conditional 
programme (procedural) alterations engendered by POCA are, we argue, 
illegitimate, because they specifically exceed legal systemic self-limitations. Legitimacy 
LVXQGHUVWRRGKHUHLQWKH/XKPDQQLDQVHQVHRIEHLQJGHILQHG¶WKURXJKdisseminated 
factual conviction in the validity of law [and] of principles and values upon which 
binding decisions are based (Luhmann 2013: 199) ² in this regard the procedures 
comprising NCB forfeiture disappoint.  
 
One final point should be made here in terms of validity, which, as mentioned above, 
is a legal systemic eigen-value. Our argument has been framed in terms of legitimacy 
or, rather, the lack thereof, but this relates specifically to the procedural changes 
implemented by POCA and does not purport to encompass any more than this 
within its ambit. Systems theory provides holistic assertions concerning legal 
systemic validity, which is both the marker of unity for the legal system and that 
which symbolizes the autopoiesis of its communications (Luhmann, 2004: 122-3). 
Indeed, Luhmann himself provides a stout argument against the notion that systemic 
YDOLGLW\FRXOGEHLQDQ\ZD\MXVWLFLDEOHVWDWLQJWKDW¶$OOODZLVYDOLGODZ/DZZKLFKLV
not valid is not law. It follows that the rule that makes validity recognizable cannot 
be one of the valid rules. There cannot be any rule in the system that regulates the 
applicability / non-DSSOLFDELOLW\RIDOOWKHUXOHVRIWKHV\VWHP·/XKPDQQVHH
also Habermas, 1  &RQVWUXFWHG RQ WKH EDFN RI WKH OHJDO V\VWHP·V ELQDU\
coding, validity is designated as being norm-free and thus both empty and malleable ² 
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this is uncontested. Nevertheless, there must necessarily be layers of legitimacy 
relative to the validity of system-internal operations, for how else could a situation 
of procedural illegitimacy on the basis of non-compliance with the meta-norms of 
rights and procedural safeguards be achieved at the same time that those procedures 
adhere to the rules established by the relative conditional programmes? Arguably 
this draws attention to a systemic recognition of difference between what is 
specifically legal ² in essence, what the legal system holds to be legal ² and what is 
legitimate. The eigen-values of validity map on to legality but not necessarily to 
legitimacy, a situation caused E\WKHV\VWHP·VRZQSURWHFWLYHPHFKDQLVPV² which is 
to say, by the self-imposed restrictions upon systemic operations that we recognize 
as rights. This, we argue, is the legal systHP·VUHFRJQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVJRLQJ
too far. NCB forfeiture aptly illustrates this in relation to criminal procedural 
protections. Part 5 of POCA allows for such protections to be circumvented simply 
E\ YLUWXH RI EHLQJ D ¶FLYLO· SURFHVV 7KLV LV D Fontentious issue, however, and our 
argument is that the use of a civil process to target criminal assets in the absence of 
criminal conviction is an affront to legitimacy.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
&ULPH HVSHFLDOO\ ¶RUJDQLVHG· FULPH LV ZLGHO\ VHHQ ERWK DV ELJ EXVLness (see, eg, 
European Council, 2012; UNODC, 2011) and as posing an invidious threat to 
VRFLHW\ $V +REEV   DUJXHV ¶8. ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DJHQFLHV DQG WKHLU
political masters currently perceive organized crime as a major threat, and this shift 
in perception is a direct consequence of a particular reading of globalization and its 
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attendant attributes, in particular the expansion of illegal economic activity and its 
FRVPRSROLWDQ DVVRFLDWLRQV· 7KLV REVHUYDWLRQ KDV UHVXOWHG LQ VXEVWDQWLDO FKDQJHV WR
criminal law and process; our focus in this article has been on how such amendments 
and augmentations relate to criminal procedural protections.  
 
As discussed at the outset, criminal processes recognize the need for enhanced 
protections based on the relationship between the State and the individual. While 
enhanced protections such as the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence 
admittedly restrict the effective exercise of police power and make the task of 
prosecutors an onerous one, we argue that these procedural safeguards are 
necessary restrictions upon the operations of the legal system. Rather than being 
perceived as important and indispensable limitations, however, the continued 
disappointment of normative expectations ² namely, the inability of the criminal 
process adequately to combat organized crime ² caused these rights-based 
protections to be cited as the problem at the heart of the operation, the very cause 
RI WKH ¶IDLOXUH· RI ODZ D ZLGHVSUHDG SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW FRQWULEXWHG WR WKHLU HURVLRQ
over the period of two decades. These changes to criminal law and processes laid 
WKH IRXQGDWLRQV IRU WKH DGRSWLRQ RI D ¶FLYLO· SURFHVV ² NCB forfeiture ² to target 
financial assets arising from criminal activities, a move that has been welcomed by 
some (e.g. Simser, 2009; Casella, 2008; Kennedy, 2004), but which has also been 
subject to stern criticism by others (e.g. Gray, 2012; Campbell, 2010). We hold with 
the latter standpoint: NCB forfeiture represents a step too far, a blatant attempt to 
avoid inbuilt procedural protections through a semantic mislabeling designating it as 
¶FLYLO·LQFKDUDFWHUDQGDWWKHYHU\UHDOH[SHQVHRIERWKFULPLQDOSURFHGXUDODQGOHJDO
systemic legitimacy.  
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